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I. Introduction
I
n the literature the persistent debt crisis of the 1980s has mainly been
interpreted as the consequence of mounting difficulties of developing
countries to service their external debt as formerly agreed. The default
issuewas raisedintermsofthedebt-servicingcapacityofdebtorcountries,i.e.,
their ability topay. But mostofthemodels builtalong these lines failed as an
early-wamingdevicefordebt-servicingproblems.1Amongthereasonsforthis
failure the missing sovereign-risk perspective is likely to figure prominently.
Defaultis notonlya matterofdebt-servicingcapacity,butalsoofthedebtor's
willingness to pay. ~ontrary to credit contracts in the national realm, the
servicing offoreign debt is hardlyenforceable bycreditors. The honouringof
contractual obligations becomes a matter ofcost-benefit calculus.2
It can, thus, be hypothesized that the recent cumulation ofdefaults and
debtrenegotiationsinvariousdevelopingcountriesis notonlytobeattributed
to impaired ability to pay. In the following analysis, an attempt is made to
address this question empirically bytestingthe relevance ofwillful defaults. A
wide definition ofdefault is applied. It covers not only debt repudiation and
permanent and unilateral moratoria that were hardly observed in the recent
past, but also mutually agreed debt renegotiations and reschedulings. The
analysis concentrates on reschedulings as the most prominent type of debt
Remark: This paper reports research undertaken in a project on the optimal structure of
capital transfers from developed to developing countries; financial support was provided by the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
1 See e.g. Feder, Just [1977]; Abassi, Taffler [1982]; Schmidt [1984]; Cline [1984]; for an
overviewontheseandotherstudiesondebt-servicingproblems,see Amelung,Mehltretter[1986].
2See e.g. Eaton,Gersovitz[1981a; 1981b]; Sachs[1983]; Sachs,Cohen[1982]; Lächler[1985].682 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
restructuringinthe 1980s.3BulowandRogoff[1986,p. 2] definereschedulings
as "negotiatedpartialdefaults". Willfuldefaultshouldthereforebeunderstood
as an interruption in debt servicing that is willfully enforced by the debtors.
Major hypotheses on the default issue are subjected to logit analysis, which
allows one to identify the impact of different factors on the probability of
default.
4 Such an analysis may heip to pave the way for more cooperative
borrower-creditorrelationsandtoreducetheconsiderabledifficultiesofmany
Third Worid borrowers in attracting foreign capital after the risk illusions of
creditors have been destroyed.
This article proceeds with the presentation ofsome hypotheses on willful
default which have been raised inthe literature(Section 11), the description of
the basic logit model (Section 111), and the specification of the estimation
equationsandthedataapplied(SectionIV). Theempiricalresultsarepresent-
ed in Section V. Section VI summarizes and draws conclusions.
11. Hypotheses on Willful Default
The notion of willful default on debt, as applied in this article, implies
rationality on the part of the borrowers. We assume that govemments of
developing countries seek the country's benefit, ratherthantheir ownbenefit.
The hypotheses on willful default largely concentrate on macroeconomic
variables.5 Public-choice reasoning would suggest, however, that the govem-
ment agents are not eager to maximize the public welfare, but rather take
decisions that improve their own well-being. It is left open in the present
analysis to which extentthegovemment's andthe country's interests differ in
the case of default decisions. This limitation should be kept in mind when
interpreting the empirical results.
3Altlloughtheface valueoftheforeign debtofhigher-incomedebtors was notreducedbythe
reschedulings ofthe 1980s, the discounted present value ofdebt-service payments was adjusted
downward through extended maturities and lower interest-rate spreads. Only very recently
outright debt forgiveness is gaining momentum for this group ofdebtors; while public creditors
granted debt relief in the case of many low-income debtors. In an ex-post perspective, the
reschedulings during the initial phase ofthe international debt management represented the frrst
step towards debt reduction.
4 This approach was applied earlier by Picht [1988].
5 Alternatively, the willingness of debtor countries to undertake policy reforms may be
considered as a proxyfor the willingness to pay. With appropriate policy reforms most problem
debtorscouldsupporttheircurrentdebtlevel. Hypothesescanthenbeconstructedthatrelatea set
ofexplanatory variables to a government's willingness to undertake policy reforms (we owe this
suggestion to an anonymous referee). Forexample, the ability ofdebtor govemments to extract
domestic resources for debt-servicing purposes without being dislodged by their constituencies
may prove significant. However, it is extremely difficult to quantify such political-economy
arguments and to subject them to empirical analysis in a cross-eountry context. We therefore
decided to test the notion ofwillful default in a direct way.Nunnenkamp/Picht: Willful Default 683
Thehypothesesonwillful defaultaddressthepotentialcostsandbenefitsof
such a behaviour for the country in question. In general terms, it would be
rational to default on debt ifthe benefits exceed the costs.6 The gains to be
reaped from default depend on the degree of foreign indebtedness and the
debt-service burden. The higher the (discounted) net value ofthe contractual
obligations that are refused to be paid, the higher the benefit for borrowers
which otherwise would have to forgo domestic resources when the credits are
due [Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981b, p. 302]. Moreover, countries may be more
inclinedtodefaultontheirdebtwhennationalincomeis lowerthanpreviously
expectedbybothlendersandborrowers[Lächler, 1985,pp. 29ff.]. Inthiscase,
the benefits from default rise relative to the potential costs, whereas the
benefit-cost ratio declines when national income is unexpectedly high. Debt
contracts involve a pre-fixed payment schedule. The debt-service profile pre-
viously agreed onbythe borrowerand the lender is based onforecasts onthe
country'sfuturecapacitytomeetits obligations. Iftheassumptionsonincome
growthproveover-optimistic,theborrowerhastotransfera highershareofthe
incremental income to the creditor. This is likely to strengthen the resistance
againstthepunctualservicingofthedebt. Furthermore,thecostsofdefaultare
supposedtobepositivelyrelatedtotheactualincomelevel, whateverform the
penalties from the creditorside maytake, i.e., the costs are lower in situations
ofunexpected income drops. Thelikelihood ofwillful default is thus hypothe-
sized to be higher (lower), when national income is unexpectedly low (high).
In deciding on default, the borrowers have to considerpossible sanctions
bytheircreditors. Thethreatoftradeembargosorwithdrawaloftrade-related
credit lines may particularly affect the decisions ofdeveloping countries that
dependheavilyonimportsofessentialinvestmentandintermediategoods(for
a discussion on the effectiveness ofsanctions, see Sachs [1983, p. 20]; Bulow,
Rogoff [1986]; Nunnenkamp [1989]). The likelihood of willful default may
thus be negatively related to the relative importance ofimports in domestic
absorption. The threat ofretaliatory actions mayaIso be high for aid-depen-
dentdevelopingcountries. Donorgovemmentsmayrefusefurtherbilateralaid
payments andpress international organizations to stop multilateral assistance
fordefaultingborrowers. Thisweakens theincentivetodefaultonforeign debt.
Inthepresenceofcross-defaultclauses,defaultingcountriesmaybecutoff
from international capital markets [Folkerts-Landau, 1985, p. 330]. The
potential costs involved depend on whether borrowers want to attract more
foreign capitalfromprivatecreditors. This is likelytobethecaseiffavourable
growthprospectsindicatethatforeign capitalinflows maybeusedproductive-
ly. A favourable growth performance should then weaken the incentive to
6 Forthe pioneering work in this respect, see Eaton, Gersovitz [1981a; 1981b]; Sachs [1983];
and Sachs, Cohen [1982].684 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
default willfully. Alternatively, it may be argued that "rapidly growing coun-
tries mayhaveless incentivetorepayloans,sincetheydonotexpecttoenterthe
market again after the period in which a net payment ofloans is necessary"
[Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981a, p. 16]. The threat of foreclosing future access to
credit markets by commercial banks would not do much harrn under such
circumstances.
A further hypothesis on the costs ofwillful default relates to short-term
fluctuations ineconomicactivity[ibid.,pp.8f.]. Governmentswillbereluctant
to default on their debt if foreign borrowing is used to smooth domestic
absorptionintertemporarily.Thisis becausebankswillprobablyrefusetoplay
their role in stabilizing consumption or investment and in compensating for
temporary export shortfalls in the case of willful default. It can thus be
hypothesizedthattheincentive to default is negatively related to the degree of
fluctuations ineconomic activity typically prevailingina borrowing country.
Theborrowersmaytrytoreducethepotentialcostsofdefaultarisingfrom
the creditors' threat to foreclose future access to credits by counterthreats. A
singleborrower'soddstogetawaywithnooronlymodestcostsarehigherifhe
decides to default when other borrowers do so as well (bandwagon effect).
Parallelbehaviourofdevelopingcountriesmaycreateproblemsfortheliquidi-
ty and solvency position ofcreditor banks. Faced by the counterthreat ofa
debtors' cartelthecreditors maycompromise onsanctions. Thelikelihoodfor
a specific country to default is thus expected to increase if other countries
decide not to service their debt [Picht, 1988, p. 335]. But even a single large
borrowermaybeabletomatchthepotentialpenaltiesofcreditorsbycounter-
threats. Largeness may refer to the amount oftotal debt accumulated which
canbeusedasaninstrumenttopressforconcessionsbythecommercialbanks
[Bulow, Rogoff, 1986]. Creditor countries mayaiso refrain from retaliatory
measures if the debtor country represents an important export market for
them. It can therefore be hypothesized that the likelihood ofwiUful default
varies positively with the economic and political weight ofborrowers.
111. The Test Format: Logit Model
The coverage ofpossible explanations ofdefault seems fairly complete,if
measuredonwhathasbeenadvancedasempiricallytestableconjecturesinthe
literature. Eachofthe hypotheses presented above deals with partialexplana-
tionsofwillfuldefaultbydevelopingcountries. Wedonotaimatincludingall
ofthemina comprehensiveandconsistenttheoreticalmodel;we ratherputthe
theoretically meaningful partial hypotheses together in a multivariate frame-
work,whichallowstosingleoutthemostrelevantvariableswithrespecttothe
developing countries' decisions on default.NunnenkamplPicht: Willful Default 685
Logitanalysisis appliedonthebasisofcross-countrydata.Thistechniqueis
well-suited for the case in question, where the phenomenon to be explained,
Le., the existence or non-existence ofdefault, can only be measured as [0/1]
alternatives. Logit analysis has several advantages as compared to other
methods. OLS-regression analysis is inadequate when the dependentvariable
is restrictedtothe[0/1]space. Simplelinearregressions maygenerateprobabil-
itiesbelow0andabove 1forthedependentvariable[Pindyck,Rubinfeld, 1981,
pp. 275 ff.]. The non-linear transformations suggested by logit, or else, by
probit models avoid this problem. The estimation results oflogit and probit
analyses for equal data sets are quite comparable [Altman et al., 1981, pp.
31 ff.]. But the former offers computational advantages due to the iterative
technique implied. Multiple discriminant analysis represents a possible alter-
native,whichwas appliedincomparablestudies[e.g. Frank,Cline, 1971]. The
majoradvantagesofthelogitapproacharethatitavoidsa-prioriclassification
into defaulting and non-defaulting countries and that it provides straight-
forward testing ofthe significance ofthe various coefficients.7
Logitanalysisallowstoassess thelikelihood(P)ofdefaultas afunctionofa
set ofexplanatory variables (X):
P (I)=[1 + exp - {a + bX)]-l. (I)
Thereby, a and b represent the estimation coefficients. Equation (1) is
subjectedtomaximumlikelihoodestimationprocedure. Itis importanttonote
that the coefficient b must not be confounded with the partialderivative. The
latter is given by:
dP (1) / dX=P (1) [1 - P (1)]b, (2)
where P stands for a chosen base level of the probability of default. This
formulacanbeusedtocalculatepredictedchangesintheprobabilityofdefault
for a given change in the independent variable [Altman et al., 1981, p. 33].
IV. Specification oftbe Model and Data Base
In moving from the basic model level to empirical testing, it has to be
decidedastohowtodefine thedependentvariable,andappropriateindicators
must be identified for the explaining variables. As concems the dependent
variable, we refer to World Bank data on multilateral debt renegotiations
[WorldBank,c,p. 28]. Theanalysiscovers 53 developingcountries. Principal-
ly, "1" is attachedtocountriesthatrenegotiatedpartoftheirdebtwiththeParis
Club, otheraid consortia, orcommercialbanks inthe 1981-1984period;ifno
7 For a detailed discussion ofthe application and the conceptuallimits ofdiscriminant and
logit analysis, see Klecka [1975] and Altman et al. [1981].686 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
renegotiations took place, the variable is set "0".8 This procedure involves
methodological problems insofar as the reschedulingOevents do not present a
complete pictureonwillful defaults. Otherforms ofdefaultare not captured,
such as unilateraldebtrepudiationbyborrowers. Butthis restriction, whichis
due to data limitations, is unlikely to distort the empirical results. For the
1981-1984periodnocasesareknowntouswheredefaultingcountriesdidnot
finally reach a rescheduling agreement with their creditors. Hence, it can be
arguedthatthedependentvariableis "1"for a11countriesthatrefusedtoservice
their debt unilatera11y.
More importantly, the rescheduling events may not only reflect willful
default, i.e., an unwillingness to pay, but also an inability to pay due to
exogenously created insolvency or illiquidity. The latter possibility has to be
takeninto accountinthe empiricalestimations to avoidbiasedresults. This is
done by supplementing the set ofhypotheses on willful default by a variable
whichcapturestheinfluenceofexternalshocksonthereschedulingevent.The
equation estimated can then be written as:9
where:
P(1) == [1 + exp - (ao + alXI + ...anXn+ an+l N)]-t, (3)
Xl, ...Xn == variables that indicate possible influences on willful
default;
N == external-shock variable.
By N the balance-of-payments impact of world-market developments
which are assumed to be beyond the control ofindividual debtor nations is
measured.lO This variable encompasses terms-of-trade effects, real world-de-
mand effects and interest-rate effects, all as a percentage share ofthe sum of
the country's exportsandimports.11 Since the reschedulings ofthe 1981-1984
periodaretobeexplained,thebalance-of-paymentsimpactis calculatedforthe
preceding three years, i.e., 1978-1980. The 1975-1977 period represents the
8Alternatively,"1"is attachedtocountrieswherethetotalamountofdebtrescheduledinthe
1981-1984 period exceeds 15 per cent of outstanding debt. Countries that renegotiated only
marginal proportions of their debt may be considered as non-default cases rather than default
cases; this applies to Pakistan (2.7 per cent), Guyana (5 per cent), Honduras (10 per cent), and
Uganda (11 percent). However, the estimation results are hardly afIected whentbis adjustmentis
made. Consequently, the detailed results oftbis variant are not presented in Section V.
9Inallcases,theconstanttermao is includedtomakesurethatthelikelihoodestimatedis not
preset to either "0" or "1" ifthe explaining variables are zero.
10Fora detaileddiscussionofthemethododologicalissues involved,seeNunnenkamp[1986,
Ch.5].
11 For calculation procedures and definitions see the Appendix.NunnenkamplPicht: Willful Default 687
reference period for price and interest-rate changes; the difference between
actual world demand in 1978-1980 and its hypothetical trend volumes is
estimatedonthebasisofprojectionsusingtheaveragegrowthrateobservedin
1971-1977.
As concerns the partialhypotheses onwillful default presented above, the"
following indicators are considered (for details see the Appendix):
- Different proxies indicate the potential benefits from default, Le., the
amountofresources saved by notservicing foreign debt. We refer to three
alternatives: outstanding debt in per cent of the debtor's gross national
product (in the following B), debt per capita of the borrowing country's
population (A), and total debt-service payments relative to GNP (C).
- The empirical test of the hypothesis that borrowers are more inclined to
default when national income is unexpectedly low requires one to make
assumptionsontheexpectedincomegrowth. Twovariantsaretried: Firstly,
the unforeseen change in economic growth is calculated as the difference
betweenactualaverageGDPper-capitagrowthinthe 1981-1984period(in
real terms) and the long-term growth trend experienced throughout the
1970s (E). Altematively, a shorter and more recent reference period is
chosen, Le., 1978-1980 (F).
- The debtors' exposure to possible sanctions ofcreditor countries is meas-
ured in terms of the borrowers' imports, as a percentage share of gross
domestic product(K), andin terms offoreign aid inflows percapitaofthe
borrowers' population (I).
- Averagegrowthofper-capitaincomeinthe 1970-1980periodis supposedto
capture the conflicting hypotheses on the impact of the longer-term eco-.
nomic performance on the likelihood ofdefault (D).
- Thestandarddeviations oftheresiduals of(1) GDPpercapita(G), and(2)
exports (H), both derived from trend estimates for the 1970s, represent
alternative measures ofthe degree ofshort-term fluctuations in economic
activity. According to the reasoning in Section 11, they are expected to be
negatively related to the likelihood ofdefault.
- Thechancesofindividualborrowerstomatchpossiblepenaltiesofcreditors
by counterthreats are measured bythe total US$-value ofoutstandingdebt
(M) andbythe share ofdeveloped countries' exports shipped to the respec-
tive debtor country (L).12
Table 1 summarizes the partial hypotheses on default and presents the
expected signs ofthe explaining variables that enter the empirical analysis.
To perform the cross-country analysis, we refer to a sampie of53 devel-
opingeconomies for which therequiredinformation is available. Thesampie
12 The hypothesis that parallel behaviour ofdebtors raises the likelihood ofwillful default
cannot be tested in the following cross-eountry analysis.688 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
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covers a wide spectrum of developing countries in terms of income level,
economic growth, foreign indebtedness, structure ofcapital importS, and the
relative success orfailure to service foreign debtonschedule. All 53 countries
entertheempiricalestimatesinthefIrst step. Subsequently,variousrestrictions
are imposed, mainly in terms ofincome level and the relative importance of
different types ofcreditors, in order to consider important subgroups ofthe
sampie specifically.
The empirical analysis on the deterrninants ofdefault is subject to some
multicollinearity problems. Relatively high correlations betweenindependent
variables do not create difficulties when alternative indicators for the same
explainingfactorareinvolved(e.g. outstandingdebtpercapita,debtinpercent
ofGNP, anddebt-service burden). High Pearson-correlationcoefficients may
distortthe empiricalresults onlyifthevariables inquestion were supposedto
enterthelogitanalysissimultaneously(e.g. developmentaidpercapitaandthe
import/GDPratio). Insuchcases, multicollinearityproblems are avoided by
excludingspecific variables from the estimation. Section V presents estimates
for different combinations of explaining variables where multicollinearity
problems are minimized in this way.Nunnenkamp/Picht: Willful Default 689
V. Empirical Results
Beforerunningmultivariateestimations,we applylogitanalysistoeachof
the above explaining variables separately. All partial default estimates, pre-
sentedinTable2,showtheexpectedsignsforthecoefficientsoftheindependent
Table 2 - PartialDefault Estimates: Logit-Analysis Results
a
Constant X Average No.of
ao t-stat. al t-stat. likeli- itera-
hood tions
Debt outstanding, 1980
US$ billion -0.14 (-0.42) 0.0318 (1.23) 0.51 5
per capita -0.01 (-0.02) 0.0001 (0.43) 0.50 4




1978-80 -0.14 (-0.34) 0.0650 (0.80) 0.50 4
Per-capita growth of
real GDP, 1970-80 0.42 (1.21) -0.1666 (-1.53) 0.51 4
Change in per-capita
growth ofGDP, 1981-84
vs. 1970-80 -0.12 (-0.36) -0.082 (-1.14) 0.51 4
vs. 1978-80 -0.03 (-0.89) -0.070 (-1.17) 0.51 4
Fluctuations
C of:
GDP, 1970-80 0.41 (0.92) -5.6561 (-0.83) 0.50 4
exports, 1970-80 0.28 (0.40) -0.9547 (-0.26) 0.50 3
Development aid in per
cent ofGDP, 1978-80 0.60 (1.54) -0.1057* (-1.71) 0.52 5
Imports in per cent of
GDP, 1978-80 0.49 (0.79) -0.0121 (-0.68) 0.50 3
Share in developed coun-
tries' exports
d
, 1978-80 0.04 (0.13) 0.2701 (0.33) 0.50 3
Extemal shocks in per
cent ofexports plus
importse, 1978-80 -0.20 (-0.55) 0.040 (1.38) 0.51 4
aTheequationestimatedcanbewrittenas:P(1)= [1 +exp- (ao+alX)rl;X denotesthevarious
explaining variables as gjven in the first column. t-statistics in parentheses; *denotes signifi-
cance at the 10 per cent level; number ofobservations: 53. - b Total debt service to GNP. -
C Standard deviation of residuals. - dImports of the sampIe countries from the European
Community,Japan, andthe United States, as apercentageshareofthe lattercountries' total
exports. - e Balance-of-payments impact ofchanges in the terms oftrade, interest rates, and
real world-market demandin 1978-80vs. 1975-77; fordetails ofcalculation, see the Appen-
dix.
Source: World Bank [a; b; cl; UNCTAD [1987]; OECD [various issues]; IMF [a; b]; own
calculations.690 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
variables. For the long-term growth indicator, where competing hypotheses
were raised in the literature, the coefficient is negative. So, the argument that
rapidly growing countries opt for default since they do not expect to rely on
further capital imports in the future is rejected. However, the explanatory
power of the partial calculations remains extremely limited. The average
likelihood ofthe estimates hardly exceeds 50 per cent.13 Moreover, only the
coefficient ofthe development-aidvariable is statisticallysignificant at the 10
per cent level.
The quality ofthe estimations interms ofcorrectlyidentifying default and
non-default cases improves only slightly when a multivariate approach is
applied to all 53 sampie countries. The highest average likelihood reportedin
Table 3 amounts to 56 per cent. The evidence on some ofour hypotheses is
considerablystronger,however, as comparedtothe partialcalculations. With
onlytwoexceptions(forvariableH,i.e.,thefluctuationinexports,in(9)and(10)
ofTable 3), all coefficients reveal the expected sign. Amongthe variables that
are significant at the 10 per cent level or better, long-term growth ofGDP
(variable D) figures prominently. In five out of six equations where D is
included,thecoefficientis significantlynegative. Thehypothesisthata favour-
able growthperformance weakens the incentive to default is stronglysupport-
ed. Apparently,fast-growing economiesarepreparedtoattractfurthercapital
inflowsinthefuture, sinceforeigncapitalmaybeabsorbedproductively. These
countries face strongincentives to refrain from willful default, because other-
wise theymaybecutofffrominternationalcapitalmarketsandtheireconomic
pelformance may suffer from the creditors' sanctions.14
For the remaining variables, the evidence is not as strong. This refers
particularly to variables A, B, and C, which are supposed to capture the
economic benefits of default. All coefficients of the debt indicators and the
debt-serviceburdenremaininsignificant. Onemaybetemptedtoconcludethat
willful defaults are motivated by other than macroeconomic considerations,
e.g. by internal political pressures that are not related to social cost-benefit
calculi. Thisreasoningis supportedbytheobservationthatvariablesLandM,
indicatingthedebtors'potentialtomatchpossiblesanctionsofthecreditorsby
counterthreats, remaininsignificant as well. 15 Inthis instance, however, other
economic factors should also be irrelevant, which is not the case:
13 Since the phenomenonto be explained, i.e., the existence ornon-existence ofdefault, can
onlybe measuredas [0/1]alternative,thebottomlineoftheprobabilityestimatedbylogitanalysis




15 The insignificance of outstanding debt (M) conflicts with the reasoning of Bulow and
Rogoff[1986] that countries with large debts will easily achieve negotiated partial default.Table 3 - Logit Estimates ofthe Probability ofDefaultfor all53 Sampie Countries
a
Constant Debt outstanding Debt- Per- Change in per- Fluctuations Develop- Imports Share in Out- External Average No.of
term service capita capita growth of: ment aid in% develop- standing shocksin likeli- iterations
per % burden growth ofGDP GDP exports per of ed coun- debt, %of hood
capita ofGNP ofreal 1981-84 1981-84 capita GDP tries' US$bill. exports+
GDP, vs. vs. exports imports)
1970-80 1970-80 1978-80
A B C D E F G H I K L M N
1) 0.08 0.093 -0.042 -0.019 0.52 5
(0.17) (1.00) (-0.68) (-1.34)
2) 0.09 0.063 -0.23* -0.100 0.53 5
(0.19) (0.68) (-1.92) (-1.45)
3) -0.24 0.048 -0.061 0.17 0.51 4
(-0.51) (0.58) (-1.00) (0.21)
4) -0.29 0.104 -0.18 0.041 0.53 5
(-0.53) (1.11) (-1.59) (1.39)
5) 0.14 0.194 -0.30** -0.054 -0.035* 0.055* 0.56 6
(0.22) (1.47) (-2.16) (-0.72) (-1.81) (1.69)
6) -0.60 0.097 -0.103 -6.0 0.044 0.53 10
(-0.89) (1.07) (-1.31) (-0.88) (1.41)
7) -0.55 0.007 -0.35** -0.118 -0.8 1.82 0.047 0.55 5
(-0.57) (0.60) (-2.13) (-1.57) (-0.17) (1.52) (1.36)
8) 0.25 0.051 -0.056 -0.014 0.52 4
(0.49) (0.17) (-0.94) (-1.12)
9) 0.67 -0.32** -0.154* 2.6 -0.036* 0.045 0.55 5
(0.65) (-2.15) (-1.93) (0.58) (-1.68) (1.33)
10) 0.14 -0.28** -0.094 2.2 -0.023 0.053 0.55 5
(0.15) (-2.04) (-1.29) (0.48)(-1.55) (1.52)
11) -0.89 0.092 -0.097 -4.6 0.030 0.046 0.53 7
(-1.21) (1.02) (-1.19) (-0.66) (1.03) (1.45)
a Fortheexactdefinitionofvariables,seetheAppendix. - b Dueto multicollinearityproblems,allvariablescannotbeconsideredintheanalysissimultaneously;
different sets ofexplaining variables are selectedfor which multicollinearityproblems are negligible. Several variables (such as A, B, and C)are considered as
alternativeindicatorsforspecifichypotheses. - t-statisticsinparentheses;* significantatthe 10percentlevel;**significantatthe 5 percentlevel(two-tailedt-test).
Estimates for which the algorithm does not converge in 20 steps are not reported.






















is lower than previously expected. According to the argument raised by
Lächler [1985], this behaviour is economically rational, since the benefits
fromdefaultriserelativetothepotentialcosts. ButvariableF is significantin
(9) exclusively.
- Apartfromtheevidenceonthelong-termgrowthvariable,othercostfactors
arerelevantasweIl. ThisrefersmainlytovariablesI andK, notwithstanding
thatthecoefficientsaresignificantinsomeequationsonly. Negativesignsof
I indicatethatthelikelihoodofdefaultdecreaseswithhigherdependencyon
foreign development aid; the incentive to default willfully is strongerwhen
the possible refusal of creditor governments to grant further assistance
involves only small amounts ofaid. Similarly, the higher the potential of
sanctions in the form oftrade embargos and foreclosure ofexport credits
(indicatedbyK), the greater the debtors' reluctance to willfully stopservic-
ing foreign debt.
The rather poor explanatory power of the above logit estimates is not
surprising. This result is typical for cross-country analyses based on a fairly
heterogeneous set ofsampie economies. Thegroupof53 countries considered




(such as Bangladesh, EI Salvador, Guatemala, India, and Somalia, where
private creditors accountedfor less than3percent oftotaldebtin 1980), and
debtors for whom the relations with commercial banks are of overriding
importance(suchasAigeria,Argentina,Brazil,andMexico,wheretherespec-
tive shares exceeded 80 per cent). In the following the heterogeneity of the
sampie is reduced by imposing restrictions in terms ofincome level and the
structure offoreign indebtedness.
Table4reportsthelogitestimatesfor36sampiecountriesforwhichprivate
creditors account for more than 25 per cent of total (public and publicly
guaranteed) debt. The cost-benefit calculus with respect to defaults on com-
mercialloans shouldplaya significant role within this subgroUp.16 Actually,
the overall explanatory power of the logit estimates improves for this less
heterogeneoussampie.Theestimatedlikelihoodincreasestoupto67 percentin
(11). Buteven this outcomeis insufficienttoserve as a basisforpredictions on
willful default. Apparently, other than the economic factors considered here
have an important impact on the bOITowers',default decisions. In particular,
the bandwagoneffect as a potential means to reduce the costs ofdefault may
16 With the exception of Zaire, this subgroup does not include any country that merely
renegotiated its public debt with aid consortia.Table 4 - Logit Estirnates ofthe Probability ofDefaultfor 36Developing Countries with Considerable Debtfrorn
Private Sources
8
Constant Debt outstanding Debt- Per- Change in per- Fluctuations Develop- Imports Share in Out- External Average No.of
term service capita capita growth of: ment aid in% develop- standing shocksin likeli- iterations
per % burden growth ofGDP GDP exports per of ed coun- debt, %of hood
capita ofGNP ofreal 1981-84 1981-84 capita GDP tries' US$bill. exports+
GDP, vs. vs. exports imports)
1970-80 1970-80 1978-80
A B C 0 E F G H I K L M N
I) 1.15 0.009 -0.22 -7.5 0.58 3
(1.01) (0.51) (-1.32) (-0.69)
2) 5.13** -0.61** -10.8 -0.070* 0.62 9
(2.58) (-2.23) (-0.61) (-1.99)
3) 0.30 -0.060 -0.124 0.018 0.54 5
(0.43) (-0.53) (-1.31) (0.63)
4) 1.21 -0.031 -0.29* -0.103 0.57 5
(1.50) (-0.28) (-1.91) (-1.05)
5) 0.61 -0.026 -0.103 -0.28 0.54 5
(0.81) (-0.27) (-1.23) (-0.30)
6) 0.93 -0.003 -0.28* 0.073* 0.60 6
(1.10) (-0.03) (-1.71) (1.83)
7) 1.17 0.036 -0.38* -0.074 -0.029 0.076* 0.61 6
(1.04) (0.23) (-1.79) (-0.66) (-0.70) (1.85)
8) -0.18 0.068 -0.163 -10.3 0.080* 0.59 9
(-0.18) (0.55) (-1.33) (-0.94) (1.79)
9) 0.52 0.019 -0.44* -0.134 -7.2 2.32 0.078* 0.64 II
(0.34) (0.90) (-1.83) (-1.19) (-1.25) (1.40) (1.74)
10) 0.49 -0.184 -0.111 0.007 0.54 5
(0.54) (-0.53) (-1.21) (0.28)
11) 4.90** -0.66** -0.173 -2.6 -0.092** 0.070 0.67 9
(2.27) (-2.19) (-1.29) (-0.50) (-2.23) (1.54)
12) 2.05 -0.37* -0.088 -4.3 -0.022 0.064 0.62 6
(1.38) (-1.74) (-0.82) (-0.83) (-0.63) (1.55)
a Share ofprivate creditors in total (public and publicly guaranteed) debt > 25 per cent. For the exact definition ofvariables, see the Appendix. - b Oue to
multicollinearity problems, all variables cannot be considered in the analysis simultaneously; different sets of explaining variables are selected for which
multicollinearity problems are negligible. Several variables (such as A, B, and C) are considered as alternative indicators for specifichypotheses. - t-statistics in
parentheses; * significantatthe 10percentlevel; ** significantatthe 5 percentlevel(two-tailedt-test). Estimatesforwhichthealgorithmdoesnotconvergein 20
steps are not reported.



















berelevant. Ina pooledanalysisfor 10 developingcountriesandthe 1976-1985
period, Picht [1988, p. 349] found this factor to be statisticallysignificant. The
governmentsofdebtorcountrieswereencouragedtooptfordefaultwhenlarge
borrowers such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico took the lead.
Allinall,Table4confirmstheresultsforthespecificvariables,aspresented
in Table 3 for all 53 sampie countries. This refers particularly to the fairly
strongevidence onthelong-termgrowthvariableD.Thefollowingdifferences
between the two sets ofestimations are noteworthy:
- Not surprisingly, the development-aid variable I is no longersignificantfor
the restricted sampie. The threat to be cut offfrom further aidpayments is
not effective for countries which strongly rely on commercial debt.17
- Contrary to I, the threat of trade sanctions is somewhat stronger for
countries with considerable debtfrom private sources. Inbothcases where
K as a measure ofimport dependency is included (equations 2 and 11) the
coefficient is significantly negative. This result supports the reasoning of
Bulow and Rogoff [1986] that the debtor's gains from trade represent a
collateral for sovereign lending.
- The impact of exogenously created liquidity and solvency problems on
default,ascapturedbytheextemal-shockvariableN,remainsfairly modest
for the overall sampie of 53 developing countries (Table 3); while N is
significantly positive in four out ofsix equations in Table 4.
Ina secondattempttoreducethesampieheterogeneity,countrieswithvery
low per-capita income are excluded from the logit analysis (Table 5).18 The
relevanceofcostconsiderationsindecidingondefaultis largelythesameasin
Table 4. This applies to the significantly negative coefficients ofvariables D
and K, as weIl as the insignificance of short-terrn fluctuations in GDP and
exports (G and H, respectively)19 and development aid (I). Sirnilarly, the
potential of counterthreats by borrowers, indicated by variables Land M,
17 ThesignificancelevelofthenegativecoefficientsofI improveswhenthelogitestimatesare
based on the 45 countries with shares ofprivate creditors in total debt ofmore than 10 per cent
(ratherthanmorethan25 percent). Theseestimationsarenotpresentedherebecauseotherresults
remain largely unaffected.
18 When the criterion applied is per-capita income>400 US$ (1980), 38 countries enterthe
analysis;inthecaseofper-capitaincome>500 US$,thesampieis reducedto32debtors.InTable5,
onlythoseestimatesarereportedwhich reveal additional information,orwhichareexcludedfrom
Table 4 since the algorithm does not converge.
19 The insignificance ofG and H conflicts with the argumentation ofEaton and Gersovitz
[1981a] thatshort-termconsumptionsmoothingrepresentsthemainreasonforsovereignborrow-
ing. The results rather support the reasoning ofBulow and Rogoff[1986, p. 26]: "The loans are
patentlynotshortterm. Itseems totallyimplausiblethatthemlersofthesecountrieshavediscount
ratessolowthattheywill repaythesedebts...,primarilyinordertobeeligibletoborrow(...)again
sometime well into the next decade".Nunnenkamp/Picht: Willful Default
Table 5 - LogitEstimates ofthe Probability ofDefaultfor




> 500 US$ I
>400 US$
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant term -4.26* -1.27 -1.20 1.89 1.18 -1.17





Debt-service burden (C) 0.104 0.089
(0.78) (0.74)
Per-eapita growth of -0.36* -0.36*
real GDP, 1970-80 (D) (-1.90) (-1.87)
Change in per-capita
growth ofGDP
1981-84 vs. 1970-80 (E) -0.407* -0.189 -0.234* -0.206
(-1.87) (-1.29) (-1.75) (-1.45)
1981-84 vs. 1978-80 (F) -0.142 -0.063
(-1.39) (-0.63)
Fluctuations of: -8.0 -7.2 -7.2 1.2
GDP(G) (-0.72) (-0.68) (-0.76) (0.13)
exports (H) 0.0 -0.1
(0.00) (-0.01)
Development aid per -0.033 -0.015
capita (I) (-1.62) (-0.98)
Imports in %ofGDP (K) -0.050*
(-1.71)
Share in developed 0.64
countries' exports (L) (0.58)
Outstanding debt 0.038 0.030
(US$ bill.) (M) (0.95) (0.77)
External shocks in %of 0.089 0.072 0.078* 0.081* 0.093* 0.101**
(exports +imports) (N) (1.62) (1.46) (1.88) (1.88) (2.03) (2.13)
Average likelihood 0.62 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.58
No. ofiterations 19 8 6 6 6 6
a Onlythoseestimatesarepresentedwhichrevealadditionalinformation.Numberofcountries
included: 38 inthecaseofper-capitaincome>400US$; 32inthecaseofper-capitaincome>
500 US$. For the exact definition of variables, see the Appendix. Due to multicollinearity
problems, all variables cannot be considered in the analysis simultaneously; different sets of
explaining variables are selected for which multicollinearity problems are negligible. Several
variables(suchasA,B,andC)areconsideredasalternativeindicatorsforspecifichypotheses.
- t-statisticsinparentheses;*significantatthe 10 percentlevel; ** significantatthe5percent
level (two-tailed t-test).
Source: World Bank [a; b; cl; UNCTAD [1987]; OECD [various issues]; IMF [a; b]; own
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continues to lack significance. Thepicture is somewhat different as far as the
indicators on the benefits to be reaped from default are concerned. For the
relatively advanced debtors (per-capita income > 500 US$ in 1980), some
evidence exists that the higher the amount offoreign resources the borrower
may get hold ofby default, the higher the likelihood ofwillful default. How-
ever, this relationship is onlysignificant in the case ofB,i.e., debt outstanding
inpercentofGNP.Asconcernstherelativebenefitsfromdefaultasreflectedin
E, Table 5 provides support to the hypothesis that the likelihood of willful
default is higher, when national income is unexpectedly low. The negative
coefficient ofvariable E reveals thatthe resistance againstthe punctualservic-
ingofforeign debtis strongerwhentheborrowerhastotransfera highershare
ofnational income to the creditors due to unforeseen income drops.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Theempiricalevidenceonthevarioushypothesesonwillfuldefaultdiffers
considerably. Hardlyanysupport is providedfor those factors which indicate
theamountofresourcestheborrowermaygetholdofbyrefusingdebt-service
payments. Somewhat better results are achieved with respect to the variables
reflectingthebenefitsrelativetothepotentialcostsofdefault. Asfarasspecific
cost factors are concerned, the highly significant long-term growth variable
points to the interest ofdebtors to maintain cooperative relations with credi-
tors as long as the borrowing country may improve its economic welfare by
attracting foreign capital. Other factors such as the dependency on imports
provide further evidence onthe effectiveness ofsanctions. Thethreatto becut
offfrom public aidinflows is relevant for low-income developing countries in
the first place. Buttheexplanatorypowerofthelogit analysis applied remains
limited. The overall qualityofthe estimations is insufficient to serve as a basis
for predictions on willful default.
The cmcial assumptionunderlying the above analysis is thatdecisions on
willful default are rational, i.e., b'ased on an economic calculus ofthe overall
benefitsandcostsforthedevelopingcountryinquestion. ThirdWorldgovern-
ments are supposedtoact inthe country'sbestinterest, ratherthanseekingto
maximize their own benefit. Both assumptions appear to be fairly restrictive,
considering our empirical results. Apparently, willful defaults are not only
motivated by aggregate welfare considerations.
Future research may show how effective internal political pressures by
specific interest groups are in inducing the government to default on foreign
debt. Theresistanceofinfluentialsegmentsofthedebtorcountries'population
against macroeconomically required adjustment programs, especially if im-
posedbyforeignpartiessuchastheInternationalMonetaryFund,demonstra-
tes the relevance ofsuch a political-economy approach [Haggard, Kaufman,Nunnenkamp/Picht: Willful Default 697
1989]. Public sentiments aboutforeign banksexploiting the developing coun-
tries may create a climate where willful default is called for, irrespective ofthe
social.costs involved.
Ina similarvein, the role ofgovernments hastobeanalysedinmoredetail.
They may have strong incentives to strengthen hostile sentiments against
commercial creditors. Such a move may be weH-suited to divert the public
attentionfromthegovernment'sownresponsibilityforeconomiccrises. Atthe
same time, however, such debtor behaviour renders it extremely difficult to
improvetheefficiencyofinternationalcapitaltransfersandtoreducesovereign
risk-in internationallending.
Itis also worthwhiletoaddressthequestionwhetheritis easiertocopewith
sovereign risk when foreign direct investment is substituted for debt finance.
Such a restructuring ofdevelopment finance might be favourable since equity
participation is essentially private in nature, while currendy Third World
indebtedness is primarily a matterofgovernments ortheir agencies. The shift




As far as the dependent variable is concerned, i.e., the incidence ofdefault
onforeign debt, we refer to World Bankinformation ondebt reschedulings in
the 1981-1984period[WorldBank,c, p. 28].20Thevariableis "1"forcountries
for which multilateral debt renegotiations with the Paris Club and other aid
consortia,commercialbanks,orbothprivateandpubliccreditorsarereported;
otherwise the variable is "0".
Data on debt outstanding in 1980 and on the average ratio oftotal debt
service to GNPin 1978-1980 is from World Bank [a]. Ifnototherwise stated,
thefigures coverpublicandpubliclyguaranteedcreditsas weH as non-guaran-
teed private debt. The share of private creditors in total debt, applied as a
measuretodiscriminatebetweenimportantsubgroupsoftheoverallsampieof
53 countries, is calculated onthe basis ofpublic andpublicly guaranteeddebt.
Per-capita income of 1980 (US$), the second discriminating variable, is pres-
entedinWorldBank[b, StatisticalAnnex,Table 1]. GrowthratesofGDPper
capita (period averages, in real terms) are taken from UNCTAD [1987]. The
standarddeviations ofthe residuals, considered as indicators ofthe degree of
short-termfluctuations inper-capitaincomeandnominalexports,arederived
from trend estimates for the 1970-1980 period; the underlying data on GDP
20 For the methodological problems involved, see Section IV.698 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
percapita(in constant prices ofdomestic currency) andmerchandise exports
(in US$, fob) are published in IMF [b].
The remaining three variables supposed to explain willful default are
defined as period averages for 1978-1980:
- Development aid per capita of the debtor country's population includes
grants and net ODA-Ioans, bothbilateral and multilateral, as presented in
OECD [various issues].21
- Import dependency is calculated as the percentage share of (nominal)
imports in (nominal) GDP. For both variables we refer to the national
accounts section in IMF [b], where both imports and GDP are given in
national currency.22
- Theshares ofthesampIe countries in developed countries' total exports are
proxied by the imports of each of the 53 developing economies from the
EuropeanCommunity,Japan,andtheUnitedStates,expressedasa percent-
age share ofthe latter countries' total exports as published in IMF [a].
The calculation ofthe external-shock variable (N) has to be explained in
somemoredetail.23 Inordertoseparateexogenousworld-marketeffects onthe
balance-of-payments situationofthe sampIe countries from influences arising
from domestic policies, the sampIe countries are assumed to be "small econo-
mies"; i.e.,thedeterminationofexportandimportprices,internationalinterest
rates, as weIl as real world-market demand cannot be influenced by any
individualdebtorcountry. Hence,Nencompassesterms-of-tradeeffects (Ntot),
interest-rateeffects (Nir),andrealworld-demandeffects (Nwd) onthecountry's
balance of payments, all expressed as a percentage share of the sum of the
country's nominal exports (X) and nominal imports (M).24
N / (X + M) == (Ntot + Nwd + Nir) / (X + M). (Al)
The three elements of N are calculated for the 1978-1980 period; the
preceding years serve as the reference periode The terms-of-trade effects are
defined as follows:
21 ForVenezuela, see Bundesministerium rürWirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit [1980; 1983].
22 Where necessary, WorId Bank [d] serves as a supplementary source.
23 Forfurthermethodologicalprocedures,see Balassa[1981,pp. 142ff.];Nunnenkamp[1986,
pp. 51 ff.].
24 N is calculated relative to the value ofexternal trade since the absolute US$-amount of
external shocks strongly depends onthe overall size ofthe sampie countries. Principally, it seems
more appropriateto relate N to the debtors'GDP,since this measure presents a betterindication
oftheexposuretoexternaIshocks. Nonetheless,we selecttheformermeasuresince multicollinear-




Ntot = I (MVt · ßPM - XVt · ßpt)
t=1978
ßptd = ptd - P~-77 (A3)
ßpt =pt - ~5-77 , (A4)
where:25 MV= importvolume;XV= exportvolume; pM = importprices(unit
values); p
X =export prices (unit values); P75-77 =reference prices; average of
1975-1977.
The world-demand effects can be written as:
1980
Nwd = I [WMS75-77 · (XVW~r _ ~ct)],
t=1978
where:26 XVWact = actual export volume of all world-market suppliers;
XVWtr=trendexportvolumeofallworld-marketsuppliers;calculatedonthe
basis of average annual growth of world export volumes in the 1971-1977
period(6.6 percent); WMS7 5-77=average world-marketshares ofthesampIe
countries in the 1975-1977 period; calculated on the basis ofexport values.
Finally, the interest-rate effects are calculated as follows:
1980 .
Nir = I (ßit D t- 1)
t=1978
ßit = it - b5-77 ,
(A6)
(A7)
where:27 i = average interest rate on foreign debt; calculated as interest
paymentsint,relativetodebtoutstandinganddisbursedattheendoft-l;D =
debt outstanding and disbursed at the end ofthe periode
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* * *
Zusammenfassung: Willkürliche Zahlungseinstellung von Entwicklungslän-
dern in den achtziger Jahren: Eine Querschnittsanalyse wichtiger Determinanten. -
Sollen Souveränitätsrisiken im internationalen Kreditgeschäft abgebautwerden, müs-
senzunächstdieDeterminantenwillkürlicherZahlungseinstellungidentifIZiertwerden.
Dies geschieht in dem vorliegenden Artikel, indem verschiedene Variablen, die den
Nutzen und die Kosten willkürlicher Zahlungseinstellung widerspiegeln, einer Logit-
Analyse unterzogen werden. Es zeigt sich, daß die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Zahlungs-
einstellung sinkt, wenn die Gläubigerein solches Verhalten mit wirksamen Sanktionen
belegen können. Die Aussagekraft der Schätzungen reicht jedoch nicht aus, um Zah-
lungseinstellungenzuverlässigvorhersagenzukönnen. EntscheidungenüberZahlungs-
einstellungenwerdennichtausschließlichvongesamtwirtschaftlichenWohlfahrtsüber-
legungen bestimmt; offensichtlich hängen sie auch von den Eigeninteressen der Regie-
rungen und einflußreichen Gruppen in den Schuldnerländern ab.
*
Resurne: Suspension de paiements intentionnelle des pays en voie de developpe-
ment dans les annres 80: une analyse transversale des determinants importants. - Si les
risques de souveraineteaux operations de credit international doiventetre diminues, il
faut d'abord identifier les determinants des suspensions de paiements intentionnelles.
Celaarrivedanscetteetuded'uneanalyselogitdesvariablesdifferentesquiindiquentles
avantages etles desavantages d'une suspension de paiements intentionnelle. Les resul-
tatsmontrentquelaprobabilited'unesuspensiondepaiementsse reduitsi les debiteurs
peuvent repondreaun tel comportementavec des sanctions effectives. Mais laqualite702 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
des estimationsnesuffitpaspourprevoiravecsureteles suspensionsdepaiemants. Les
decisions concemant les suspensions de paiements ne sont pas seulement determinees




Resurnen: Moratorias arbitrarias de paises en desarrollo en los afios ochenta: un
analisis de determinantes importantes. - Parapodercontrolarlos riesgos de soberania
enel mercadocrediticiointernacionalhayqueprimeramenteidentificarlasdeterminan-
tes de moratorias arbitrarias. Esto se realiza eneste trabajo enel marcode unanälisis
Logit de diferentes variables que reflejan los costos y beneficios de moratorias arbitra-
rias. Se muestra que la probabilidad de una moratoria disminuye si el acreedor logra
establecer sanciones efectivas. Las estimaciones, empero, no permiten pronosticar
moratorias con certeza. La toma de decisiones sobre moratorias no esta determinada
solamente por el bienestar de un pais, sino tambien por los intereses propios de los
gobiemos y de grupos de presi6n importantes de los paises deudores.